Selected Problems of Ohio Legislative Policy: A Proposed Summary Judgment Statute for Ohio by Wills, Robert L.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 19 WINTER 1958 NUMBER 1
SELECTED PROBLEMS OF OHIO LEGISLATIVE POLICY
A PROPOSED SUMMARY JUDGMENT STATUTE
FOR OHIO
ROBERT L. WILLS*
It has long been established, both at common law and under the
Field-type Codes of Civil Procedure, that the parties to a civil action
have a right to a trial of the issues of fact raised by the pleadings. This
is reinforced by the rule that both a demurrer and a motion for judgment
on the pleadings are limited to the face of the pleadings which they
attack; to put it differently, they "admit the truth of all well-pleaded
facts" in those pleadings.1 As a result of these rules, a contested civil
action cannot be disposed of without trial, generally speaking, unless the
pleadings show on their face, as a matter of law, that one party or the
other is entitled to judgment. Thus, even though a plaintiff knows that
it is almost certain that a verdict will be directed against him if the case
goes to trial, the case must be set down for trial. And even though a
defendant who has filed an answer containing a general denial knows
that he will be unable to offer any substantial evidence at the trial to
contradict the allegations of plaintiff's petition, the case must be set down
for trial. If it is the plaintiff's case that is fatally weak, when the case
does go to trial, a verdict will be directed against the plaintiff upon his
opening statement or upon the evidence. When this happens, the time of
the litigants, counsel, witnesses, court and jury has been wasted. Worse
yet, a plaintiff with a weak case is often reluctant to go to trial, and the
case is continued repeatedly before it is finally tried or dismissed for
want of prosecution. If it is the defendant's case that is fatally weak,
the defendant may settle on the eve of trial, or may even fail to appear
at the trial. In this situation, the plaintiff has been required to wait weeks,
months or years for justice, and usually to expend time and money in
preparation for trial, which preparation ultimately turns out to be un-
*Professor of Law, Ohio State University; member of the Judicial Council of
Ohio.
1"Since the petition has been challenged by demurrer, the facts pleaded
therein are confessed to be true. .. .' State ex tel. Rudd v. Industrial Commission,
116 Ohio St. 67, 75, 156 N.E. 107, 110 (1927).
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necessary. While such cases are, fortunately, the exception rather than
the rule, it cannot be denied that they exist in substantial numbers and
that they are a factor in the delay of the trial of cases and the cluttering
of court dockets.
Is there any procedure under present Ohio law by which a party
may go behind the face of his adversary's pleading, and establish that
there is no genuine issue of fact between the parties, even though an
issue of fact does appear upon the face of the pleadings? Many years
ago, the Ohio Supreme Court held that there was such a procedure. In
White v. Calhoun,2 plaintiffs brought an action upon an account stated.
Defendant filed an answer apparently consisting of a general denial.
Plaintiffs filed a motion to strike the answer from the files for the
reason that it was a sham and false answer, filed in bad faith and for
the purpose of delay. On hearing, this motion was sustained and the
answer ordered stricken from the files. The court thereupon found
that defendant did owe the plaintiffs the amount demanded in the
petition, and rendered judgment therefor, with costs. The judgment was
affirmed by the Circuit Court and the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court stated, in part:
It is not contended that the answer interposed by de-
fendant was frivolous, or insufficient in form. Nor is any
question made but that the answer tendered an issue and that,
as the case stood on petition and answer, the issue thus tendered
was a jury issue. A frivolous answer is one that contains no
valid defense, one which is insufficient on its face. A sham
answer is one good in form, but false in fact, and not pleaded
in good faith. The complaint of plaintiff in error [defendant]
is that, in such condition of the pleadings, the answer being
perfect in form, the trial court was without power to strike it
off, because the defendant had a constitutional right to have
his case tried by a jury. And that presents the real question in
the case.
The printed record shows that the defendant took a bill
of exceptions; that it was filed and notice issued. But such
bill is not printed, and we do not find it among the original
papers, even if its presence there were important, which it is
not, because not printed. Nor is there any finding of facts.
Ve are to presume, therefore, in support of the action of the
trial court with respect to the motion and the final judgment
rendered, that sufficient evidence was adduced to warrant the
action of the court, provided there was power in the court to
receive and act upon any evidence whatsoever. The striking off
on motion of pleadings and papers from the files is recognized
by section 5126, Revised Statutes,3 and is familiar practice in
23 Ohio St. 401, 94 N.E. 743 (1911).
3 Now OHIO REV. CODE §2309.70 (1953): "Motions to strike pleadings and
papers from the files may be made with or without notice, as the court directs."
[Author's footnote.]
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this state. But the precise question involved in this record seems
not to have been before this court in any case reported with
opinion.. . . Our statute does not in terms provide, as is pro-
vided in the statutes of many states, for the striking off of
sham answers. But the authorities cited . . . fully support the
proposition that the power is inherent and has been exercised
from time immemorial as a power existing at common law.
And why should such power not exist and why, in a proper
case, should it not be exercised? As defined in Gostorfs v.
Taafe, 'it is a power simply to inquire whether there is in fact
any question to be tried, and if there is not, but the defense is
a plain fiction, to strike out the fictitious defense.' It is objected
that the entertaining of such motion deprives defendant of his
right to have his case tried by a jury in its regular order and is
simply a short cut to a disposition of the case in advance of the
other cases on the docket; that to sustain the judgments below
would give encouragement to a vicious practice, one leading to
vexatious and untimely interference with the due course of
justice. . . . [The motion] demonstrates, if sustained, that
there is no defense. In that situation what is there to try to a
jury? Surely nothing, and as surely the defendant has lost no
right, constitutional or other; on the contrary, a plain right of
the plaintiff has been vindicated and the interests of justice
have been subserved. It seems idle, in this day, when the ef-
forts of lawyers, some of them at least of the highest class,
are being strenuously exerted in the direction of securing a
more speedy administration of justice, to talk about the right
of a defendant to stand for months and perhaps years upon a
sham defense, thus preventing judgment, a defense which will
crumble at the first assault upon it when the case is reached.
The very statement of the proposition condemns it. It is
simply a bold proposition, the effect of which is to obstruct
the due administration of justice.
This conclusion is strengthened when we consider the
provisions of our statutes respecting interrogatories and the
taking of testimony by deposition. . . . Having in mind these
provisions for facilitating the administration of justice, how
would their use affect a situation like one involved in the case
at bar? Let us suppose that the plaintiffs had, after the filing
of the answer, taken the deposition of defendant, and, under
the fire of sharp examination, he had admitted, clearly and
without question, that he did owe the debt just as alleged in
the petition. . . . The deposition in due time would be filed
with the other papers, and there it would lie as a companion
to defendant's answer already filed. Now it is the proposition
of the objectors that those two papers, the last in date ab-
solutely destroying the effect in law of the former, must lie
there on the files until the cause shall be reached in its regular
order. Suppose that to be done, then what? To preserve intact
that great constitutional right of the defendant to delay justice
1958]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
a jury is called. The plaintiff thereupon proceeds to offer and
read the deposition of the defendant, and rests. The defendant
has no proof to offer for the excellent reason that he dare not
risk a prosecution for perjury by undertaking to deny his last
sworn statement. The plaintiff thereupon asks a directed
verdict. Why not? What is there for a jury to consider and
decide? Absolutely nothing. The result reached is that, to
preserve the defendant's great constitutional right of delay,
the plaintiff has been kept out of his own, for a year more or
less it may be, and the result otherwise is precisely the same as
it would have been had the sham answer been assailed by a
motion at any early state of the case ...
Our conclusion is that a motion to strike off an answer
believed to be a sham answer is proper practice, and that the
trial court has power to entertain, hear and determine such
motion. It may be proper to add, in order to prevent mis-
understanding, that the discretion of the court in such case
should be exercised wisely and with discrimination, and such
motion sustained only upon such showing upon the part of the
plaintiff as leaves no question whatever of the truth and con-
clusiveness of the plaintiff's evidence. A situation in which
there is conflict of evidence upon any material point, or ad-
mitting of a'rational doubt as to the proper order to be made,
should result in the overruling of the motion.
There is no error in the judgments below, and they will
be affirmed.
Thus the Ohio Supreme Court established clearly and unequivocally
that a trial court has the power to strike a sham pleading from the files
and enter judgment against the party who filed the sham pleading.
However, in spite of the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling in White v.
Calhoun, the power to strike sham pleadings has been exercised very
sparingly by the Ohio courts. There are several reasons for this. First
of all, in White v. Calhoun itself, although the trial court granted
plaintiff's motion to strike defendant's answer from the files and entered
final judgment for plaintiff, the defendant did not file a proper bill of
exceptions in connection with his error proceedings. Therefore, although
defendant prosecuted error to the old Circuit Court and thence to the
Supreme Court, the appellate courts did not have -before them the
evidence upon which the trial court based its finding that defendant's
answer was a sham. All that was before the Supreme Court was the
original record of the trial court, showing merely that the trial court
had sustained plaintiffs' motion to strike defendant's answer as a sham
(and presumably for judgment in his favor). Therefore the Supreme
Court concerned itself principally with the question of the power of 'the
trial court to strike a sham pleading. It did not discuss comprehensively
the all-important question of the kinds of evidence which may properly
be considered by a trial court in determining whether a pleading is a
sham. The Supreme Court did, by way of illustration, state that a
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deposition of the party against whom the motion is made might properly
be considered by the trial court. Although it did not limit the trial court
to such a deposition,4 it did not discuss other kinds of evidence which
might properly be considered. Therefore, White v. Calhoun did not
lay down a satisfactory guide to the trial courts of Ohio as to the
materials which might properly be considered in connection with motions
to strike sham pleadings. Later reported decisions have not clarified this
matter to any extent.' Consequently, Ohio lawyers and trial courts have
been sailing on uncharted waters so far as motions to strike sham plead-
ings are concerned, and trial courts have been understandably reluctant
to grant such motions. It is probably correct to say that most Ohio
lawyers feel that it is useless to file a motion to strike a sham pleading,
except perhaps in the case of a clear cut admission by the adverse party
in a deposition or in answers to interrogatories. There is insufficient
judicial authority in Ohio for the use of affidavits in connection with
motions to strike sham pleadings. As will be explained infra, the writer
believes that the use of affidavits is absolutely essential to a workable and
effective procedure for piercing the allegations of pleadings.
Other jurisdictions had similar difficulties with the motion to strike
sham pleadings. These difficulties led to the enactment of statutes pro-
viding for summary judgment procedure.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PROCEDURE
Although there were some early and limited beginnings in the
United States,' the development of summary judgment procedure really
began with the enactment by the English Parliament of the Summary
Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act7 in 1855. As the title indicates,
the Act was limited to actions on bills of exchange and promissory notes.
The English summary procedure was later extended to various other
kinds of actions, and the procedure was improved.'
4 The opinion strongly implies that the answers of a party to interrogatories
might also be considered by the trial court.
The problem is discussed in Metzenbaum v. Lyman, 65 Ohio L. Abs. 90,
49 Ohio Op. 167, 108 N.E. 2d 869 (1952), decided by the Common Pleas Court of
Cuyahoga County, and in the Note on that case in 14 Onio ST. LJ. 342 (1952).
The Metenbaum opinion states: ". . . the means available for determining
whether or not an answer presents a sham defense are: (a) the pleadings them-
selves, (b) affidavits, (c) exhibits, (d) depositions and (e) evidence introduced
by the parties upon hearing of the motion to strike." Approval of these views by
the Supreme Court of Ohio would increase the effectiveness of motions to strike
sham pleadings.
6Millar, Three American Ventures in Summary Civil Procedure, 38 YALE
L.J. 193 (1928) (South Carolina, Kentucky and Virginia).
718 & 19 Vier., c. 67 (1855).
8 An extensive discussion of the development of the English summary pro-
cedure may be found in Bauman, The Evolution of the Summary Judgment
Procedure, 31 INDIANA L.J. 329 (1956).
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As experience under the English summary procedure was highly
satisfactory, various American jurisdictions enacted legislation patterned
to a considerable extent on the English legislation. 9 There was, how-
ever, considerable variation in the legislation of the various states.10
Thus, by 1938, summary judgment procedure had ceased to be a
novelty. A very considerable body of experience had developed in the
American states having the procedure, and comparison of the advantages
of the various types of statutes was possible. Therefore, in the prepa-
ration of the proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Advisory
Committee included a provision for summary judgment procedure
(Rule 56). The Advisory Committee, in drafting Rule 56, utilized
the experience of the different states under their varying provisions for
summary judgment.
Experience under Federal Rule 56 has been satisfactory. It is true
that in the first few years under the Federal Rules, some federal courts
were too liberal in granting motions for summary judgment. This was
no doubt due to unfamiliarity with the procedure. As the federal bench
and bar became more familiar with summary judgment procedure, there
were fewer instances of the improper granting of motions for summary
judgment. Although in recent years there has been criticism of other
Federal Rules, the writer knows of no basic opposition to Rule 56.
There have been, it is true, suggestions for minor improvements in
Rule 56, some of which will be discussed infra. Since 1938, several
states have adopted summary judgment procedures following Federal
Rule 56 more or less closely."
THE PROPOSED OHIO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
STATUTE
In Ohio, bills authorizing summary judgment procedure have been
introduced in several sessions of the General Assembly. So far, all have
failed of passage.
In 1956, the Judicial Council of Ohio approved the principle of
9 Among these were New Jersey (1912), Michigan (1915), New York (1921),
Connecticut (1928), Massachusetts (1929), Rhode Island (1929), Wisconsin (1931),
Illinois (1933), and California (1933).
10 Clark and Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE L.J. 423 (1929),
discusses the early American summary judgment statutes and rules, quoting many
of them in full. Excellent general discussions of the historical development of
summary judgment procedure may be found in MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF TFIE
TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICA. PERSPECTIVE (1952), Chap. XVI, "Motions for Sum-
mary Disposition on the Merits," and in CLARK, CODE PLEADING §88 (2nd ed. 1947).
31 Several states have adopted the Federal Rules almost in their entirety.
Others have borrowed heavily from them. A recent survey of the various current
summary judgment procedures is contained in Korn and Paley, Survey of Sum-
mary Judgment, Judgment on the Pleadings and Related Pre-trial Procedures,
42 CORNELL L.Q. 483 (1957). This article is adapted from the study prepared for
the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure of the New York State
Temporary Commission on the Courts.
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summary judgment procedure, and prepared a proposed bill embodying
its recommendation.' 2 In 1957, Senate Bill No. 214, which was in
conformity with the Judicial Council's recommendation, was introduced
in the 102nd Ohio General Assembly by Senators Simpson and Morgan.
The bill was approved in principle by the Judicial Administration and
Legal Reform Committee of the Ohio State Bar Association. In the
Senate, the bill was referred to the Code Revision Committee, and, with
some changes, was recommended by that Committee for passage. How-
ever, it died in the Rules Committee of the Senate. Subsequently, the
Ohio Judicial Council voted to continue to recommend the enactment
of summary judgment legislation. Likewise, the Judicial Administration
and Legal Reform Committee of the Ohio State Bar Association voted
to continue consideration of the subject of summary judgments.'" In
view of this interest in the subject of summary judgments, the writer is
hopeful that there will be further discussion of the subject by Ohio
lawyers and judges, and that summary judgment legislation will eventu-
ally be enacted by the Ohio General Assembly.
The following is the text of a proposed Ohio summary judgment
statute. It follows closely Senate Bill 214 of the 102nd Ohio General
Assembly as recommended by the Code Revision Committee of the
Senate, with certain changes therefrom which will be discussed infra.
A BILL
To enact section 2311.041 of the Revised Code
to authorize the entering of summary
judgments in cases where there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact, and
a party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.
SECTION 1. That section 2311.041 of the Revised
Code be enacted to read as follows:
Sec. 2311.041. Summary judgment may be granted in
a civil action as provided in this section.
(A) A party seeking to recover upon a cause of action
or counterclaim or to obtain a declaratory judgment, or a party
against whom a cause of action or counterclaim is asserted or
a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time after the
action is at at issue, move with or without supporting affidavits
for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part
thereof.
(B) The motion for summary judgment shall be filed at
least ten days before the time fixed for the hearing thereon.
12 THIRTEENTH REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF OHIO, 17 (1957).
13 Report of Judicial Administration and Legal Reform Committee, 30 OHIo
BAit 337, 340-1 (April 29, 1957).
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The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may file opposing
affidavits. Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions
of the genuineness of papers or documents, and affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. The test for determining the existence of a genuine issue
as to a material fact shall be the same as the test for the deter-
mination of a motion for a directed verdict at the trial; sum-
mary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions of
the genuineness of papers or documents, and affidavits, if any,
that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that
conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for
summary judgment is made; the party against whom the
motion for summary judgment is made is entitled to have such
depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions of the
genuineness of papers or documents, and affidavits construed
most strongly in his favor. A summary judgment, interlocutory
in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(C) If on motion under this section summary judgment
is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked
and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion,
by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without sub-
stantial controversy and what material facts are actually and
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order
on its journal specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount
of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing
such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the
trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed estab-
lished, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(D) Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be ad-
missible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred
to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto. The court may
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions
or by further affidavits. When a motion for summary judg-
ment is made and supported as provided in this section, an
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials
of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise
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provided in this section, must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond,
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(E) Should it appear from the affidavits of a party op-
posing the motion for summary judgment that he cannot for
sufficient reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to
justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or discovery to be had or may make such other order
as is just.
The remainder of this article will consist of a point by point dis-
cussion of this proposed statute.
RELATIONSHIP OF PROPOSED OHIO STATUTE TO
FEDERAL RULE 56
In the preparation of the proposed Ohio statute, Federal Rule 56
was taken as a starting point. However, the proposed statute is by no
means a mere copy of Federal Rule 56. In addition to verbal changes
which were necessary to conform to the nomenclature of Ohio practice,
various substantial changes were made. These changes will be discussed
under subsequent headings.
VERBAL CHANGES FROM FEDERAL RULE 56
The framers of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure studiously
avoided the phrase "cause of action," substituting for it the word
"claim."' 4  The phrase "cause of action" is more familiar in Ohio
practice, and is therefore used in place of "claim" throughout the pro-
posed Ohio statute.
The word "cross-claim" is used in the Federal Rules to describe a
claim by a party against a co-party. In Ohio practice, the word "cross-
claim" is not used; the term "counterclaim" includes a claim by a de-
fendant against a co-defendant.'5
Throughout the Federal Rules, emphasis is placed upon the serzce
of various papers, rather than upon their fil.ng. In general, Ohio practice
still puts the emphasis upon filing, and therefore the word "filing" is sub-
stituted for the word "service" throughout the proposed Ohio statute.
As the proposed statute, if enacted, would become a section of the
Revised Code of Ohio, the word "section" is substituted throughout for
the word "rule."
Throughout the Federal Rules, paragraph headings are used. This
is done in Rule 56. Corresponding paragraph headings in Senate Bill
No. 214 were deleted to conform to Ohio legislative style requirements.
14 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 146 (2d ed. 1947).
15 OHIO REV. CODE §2309.16 (1953).
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DISCIPLINARY PROVISIONS OF FEDERAL RULE 56 ELIMINATED
Paragraph (g) of Federal Rule 56 permits the court to impose cost
penalties for the filing of affidavits in bad faith or for the purpose of
delay, and also provides that any offending party or attorney may be
adjudged guilty of contempt. Such provisions were thought to be too
drastic for inclusion in the proposed Ohio statute, and were accordingly
eliminated completely.
WHEN MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY BE FILED
Paragraph (A) of the proposed Ohio statute provides that a motion
for summary judgment may be filed at any time after the action is at
issue. Although Federal Rule 56 provides that the motion may be made
at an earlier point,16 serious delay will rarely result from postponing the
motion for summary judgment until the action is at issue. Postponing
the motion until this point will give the parties full opportunity to narrow
the issues by the pleadings as much as possibleY1
EITHER PARTY MAY MOVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Although the 1855 English statute"8 authorized only the plaintiff
to move for summary judgment, New York, in 1933, broadened its
summary judgment rule (Rule 113) to make the motion available to
the defendant as well. Other states followed suit,19 and when the
Federal Rules became effective in 1938, Rule 56 made the motion avail-
able to any party. While it is probably true that plaintiffs will have more
frequent occasion than will defendants to move for summary judgment,
the remedy should be made available to both parties. Paragraph (A) of
the proposed Ohio statute is so drawn, making it available to "a party
against whom a cause of action or counterclaim is asserted or a declara-
tory judgment is sought," as well as to "a party seeking to recover upon
a cause of action or counterclaim or to obtain a declaratory judgment."
Thus, under the proposed Ohio statute, either a plaintiff or a defendant
may move for summary judgment upon a cause of action asserted by a
plaintiff against a defendant, either plaintiff or defendant may move for
summary judgment upon a counterclaim by a defendant against a plain-
tiff, and either of two co-defendants may move for summary judgment
upon a counterclaim asserted by one such co-defendant against the other.
16Paragraph (a) of Federal Rule 56 permits a party seeking to recover
upon a claim to move for summary judgment at any time after the expiration of
20 days from the commencement of the action. Paragraph (b) permits a party
against whom a claim is asserted to make such a motion at any time.
17Michigan permits the motion for summary judgment by the plaintiff "at
any time after any cause arising upon contract or judgment, or statute shall be at
issue...." MICH. STAT. ANN. §27.989 (1938).
18 Supra note 7.
19 Wisconsin (1934) and California (1939). MILLAR, op. cit. supra note 10,
at 246.
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOT LIMITED TO ANY PARTICULAR TYPE
OF CIVIL ACTION
The 1855 English summary procedure statute was limited to actions
on bills of exchange and promissory notes.20 The original New Jersey
summary judgment statutes and rules were limited to actions to recover
a debt or liquidated demand arising upon a contract, judgment or
statute.2 ' The original Michigan summary judgment statute was limited
to actions arising out of contract or judgment.22 The first New York
summary judgment provisions were limited to actions arising on contract
or on a judgment for a stated sum. 23 In 1932, the New York summary
judgment rules were broadened to include several other types of action.
Experience under such limited provisions demonstrated that much judicial
energy was wasted in deciding whether a particular action came within
the scope of the statute or rule.2 4 By the time the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were formulated, in the Thirties, it had become ap-
parent that it was unnecessary and unwise to limit arbitrarily the kinds of
action in which summary judgment may be granted. Courts should have
the power to grant summary judgment in any type of civil action, even
though it is inevitable that it will be granted relatively infrequently in
some kinds of actions. 5 Accordingly, Federal Rule 56 authorized sum-
mary judgment procedure in any type of civil action. Most of the states
which have adopted summary judgment procedure since 1938 have
made it available in any type of civil action.26 Likewise, the proposed
Ohio summary judgment statute begins by stating, "Summary judgment
may be granted in a civil action as provided in this section." Thus it
20 Supra note 7.
21 N.J. Laws 1912, 380; 2 N.J. CoMP. STAT. §§291, 292 (Supp. 1915); Rules
57-60, N.J. Laws 1912, 394-395.
22 3 MICH. COMP. LAWS (Cahill, 1915) c. 234, §§12581, 12582.
23 N.Y. Civil Practice Rules 113 and 114, effective in 1921.
24 See, for example, the many cases in Annot., What amounts to "debt,"
"liquidated demand," "contract," etc., 'within contemplation of summary or ex-
pedited judgment statutes, 107 A.L.R. 1221 (1937).
25 "The modern tendency in drafting is to move away from the specification
of restricted types of suits in which summary judgments are allowed toward a
broad provision applying to all actions." CLARK, COD PLEADING 557 (2d ed. 1947).
"In short, a false denial in an answer is without merit regardless of the kind
of action in which it is interposed." Ritter and Magnuson, The Motion for
Summary Judgment and its Extension to All Classes of Actions, 21 MARQUErrE L.
REV. 33, 47 (1936).
20Wisconsin's original summary judgment rule, Wis. STAT. §270.635 (1931),
adopted in 1929, patterned after Rule 113 of the New York Civil Practice Act,
was narrowly limited as to types of action. The Wisconsin rule was subsequently
broad.-ned to include certain other types of action, and finally, in 1941, Wisconsin
dropped all such restrictions, making summary judgment procedure available
';n any civil action or special proceeding." Wis. STAT. §270.635 (1951).
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would make summary judgment procedure available in any civil action,
without restriction as to type.2"
THE TEsr FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT THE SAME As THE TEsT
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT
The test for the granting or denial of a motion for summary judg-
ment was not explicitly stated in Federal Rule 56. The Rule states that:
The [summary] judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith
if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.
However, Rule 56 does not explicitly state any test by which the trial
court is to determine whether there is a "genuine issue as to any material
fact." Partly because of this, perhaps, there was some initial confusion
in the consideration of motions for summary judgment in the federal
courts under Rule 56. By now, the dose analogy between the summary
judgment and the directed verdict has been clearly recognized.2" It seems
desirable to reduce the possibility of similar initial confusion in Ohio by
including in the legislation an explicit statement of the test which the
Ohio courts should apply in passing on a motion for summary judgment.
This has been done in the proposed Ohio statute by including in paragraph
(B) the following sentence:
2 7 Paragraph (A) of the proposed Ohio statute states specifically that
summary judgment procedure is available in actions for declaratory judgments.
This may be thought to be unnecessary. The reference to declaratory judgments
is inserted as a matter of precaution, following the example of Federal Rule 56
in this respect.2 8 
"But functionally the theory underlying a motion for summary judgment
is essentially the same as the theory underlying a motion for directed verdict.
The crux of both theories is that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be
determined by the trier of the facts, and that on the law applicable to the estab-
lished facts the movant is entitled to judgment." 6 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrIcE 2020
(2d ed. 1953).
"A summary disposition . . .should be on evidence which a jury would not
be at liberty to disbelieve and which would require a directed verdict for the
moving party." Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 321 U.S. 620, 62+ (1944).
"With all that in mind, we cannot now say-as we think we must say to
sustain a summary judgment-that at the close of a trial the judge could properly
direct a verdict." Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F. 2d 464, 470 (C.C.A. 2, 1946).
"Only when the evidence is such that it is clear the jury would have none
to go on, though they believed that unfavorable to the movant for summary
judgment, can the motion [for summary judgment] be sustained and a jury trial
denied." Firemen's Mutual Ins. Co. v. Aponaug Mfg. Co., 149 F. 2d 359, 363
(C.C.A. 5, 1945). '
"To support summary judgment the situation must justify a directed verdict
insofar as the facts are concerned." Dewey v. Clark, 180 F. 2d 766, 772 (C.A.
District of Columbia 1950).
"According to judicial pronouncements, the test for determing whether
summary judgment should be granted is whether a motion for directed verdict
1958] SUMMA'RY JUDGMENT
The test for determining the existence of a genuine issue as
to a material fact shall be the same as the test for the deter-
mination of a motion for a directed verdict at the trial; sum-
mary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions
of the genuineness of papers or documents, and affidavits, if
any, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and
that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion
for summary judgment is made; the party against whom the
motion for summary judgment is made is entitled to have
such depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions of the
genuineness of papers or documents, and affidavits construed
most strongly in his favor.29
This sentence is derived directly from some of the leading Ohio cases on
directed verdicts since the old "scintilla rule" was abandoned and the
"reasonable minds" test adopted in 1934.3" The explicit inclusion of the
directed verdict test in the proposed Ohio summary judgment statute
should make it clear that the proposed statute would not clothe the trial
judge with arbitrary power to deprive litigants of their right to trial by
jury. It is no more an invasion of the right of,trial by jury to grant a
motion for a summary judgment than to direct a verdict upon the
opening statements or upon the evidence. 31
should be granted if the same state of facts existed at the coficlusion of plaintiff's
case." Orvis v. Brickman, 95 F. Supp. 605 (D.C. District of Columbia 1951).
An extended discussion of the use of the directed verdict test in connection
with motions for summary judgment is contained in Comment, Summary Judgment
-Rule 56, 51 NoRTrwEERN U.L. Ray. 370 (1956). The Comment points out that
the directed verdict test should not be applied so as to prevent summary judgment
in favor of the party having the burden of proof. To so apply the test would be
clearly improper; from the beginning of the development of summary judgment
procedure, it has been available to plaintiffs.
Even a literal application of the directed verdict test to a motion for summary
judgment should not cause trouble on this point in Ohio, in view of the interpreta-
tion of the "reasonable minds" test for a directed verdict by the Ohio courts, which
interpretation apparently permits a directed verdict in favor of the party having
the burden of proof. Any doubt on this point should be removed by the inclusion
of the last two sentences in paragraph (D) of the proposed Ohio statute, which
are discussed infra, in the text following note 47.
29The quoted test was broken down into three sentences in Senate Bill No.
214. However, as it purports to be a single comprehensive statement of the Ohio
test for a directed verdict, it is probably desirable from a drafting standpoint to
state the test in a single sentence.
3 0 Wilkeson v. Erskine & Son, 145 Ohio St. 218, 61 N.E. 2d 201 (1945);
Durbin v. Humphrey Co., 133 Ohio St. 367, 14 N.E. 2d 5 (1938) ; Hamden Lodge,
I.O.O.F. v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 127 Ohio St. 469, 189 N.E. 246 (1934).
31 The question of the constitutionality of summary judgment legislation has
long since been settled. The constitutionality of the New York summary judgment
rule was upheld in General Investment Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co.,
235 N.Y. 133, 139 N.E. 216 (1923). The New York court stated, in its opinion:
"The argument that rule 113 infringes upon the right of trial by jury guaranteed
by the Constitution cannot be sustained. The rule in question is simply one regu-
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THE USE OF AFFIDAVITS IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEDURE
The key feature of summary judgment procedure is the use of
affidavits. Summary judgment procedure without affidavits would be
like a ham sandwich without ham. Without the use of affidavits, a
motion for summary judgment would be as unsatisfactory as the present
Ohio motion to strike sham pleadings. However, it is unfortunately
true that most of the opposition to summary' judgment legislation is
directed toward the affidavit feature. Much of this opposition apparently
results from a basic misunderstanding of the function of the affidavits
in summary judgment procedure.
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the enactment of the
proposed summary judgment statute would not alter the long established
Ohio policy that affidavits32 are generally inadmissible in evidence" ex-
cept to obtain a provisional remedy, or upon a motion, and certain other
purposes specified by statute.3 4
In summary judgment procedure, affidavits are not used as evidence
to determine disputed questions of fact. "These [summary judgment]
affidavits stand on a different footing from those in cases where the trial
judge is simply deciding a question of fact upon affidavits.""3 Thus, in
passing upon a motion to quash the service of summons, an Ohio judge
lating and prescribing procedure, whereby the court may summarily determine
whether or not a bona fide issue exists between the parties to the action. A deter-
mination by the court that such issue is presented requires the denial of an
application for summary judgment and trial of the issue by jury at the election of
either party. On the other hand, if the pleadings and affidavits of plaintiff disclose
thataio defense exists to the cause of action, and a defendant, as in the instant
case, fails to controvert such evidence and establish by affidavit or proof that it
has a real defense and should be permitted to defend, the court may determine
that no issue triable by jury exists between the parties and grant a summary
judgment."
The constitutionality of summary judgment procedure in the District of
Columbia was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Fidelity & Deposit
Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 320 (1902), wherein the Court stated: "If it were
true that the rule deprived the plaintiff in error of the right of trial by jury, we
should pronounce it void without reference to cases. But it does not do so. It pre-
scribes the means of making an issue. The issue made as prescribed, the right of
trial by jury accrues. The purpose of the rule is to preserve the court from
frivolous defenses and to defeat attempts to use formal pleading as means to delay
the recovery of just demands."
Other cases upholding the constitutionality of summary judgment procedure
may be found in CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 564 (2d ed. 1947) and in Annot., Con-
stitutionality of statute or rule of court providing for summary judgment unless
affildavit of merits is filed, 69 A.L.R. 1031 (1930), 120 A.L.R. 1400 (1939).
32 An affidavit is defined in OHIO REv. CODE, §2319.02 (1953) as "a written
declaration under oath, made without notice to the adverse party."
33 State ex rel. Copeland v. Medical Board, 107 Ohio St. 20, 140 N.E. 660
(1923) ; Robinson v. Harrison, 7 Ohio N.P. 273, 9 Ohio Dec. N.P. 701 (1898).
34 OHIO REV. CODE §2319.03 (1953).
35 Rugg, C. J., in Norwood Morris Plan Co. v. McCathy, 295 Mass. 597, 603-4,
4 N.E. 2d 450, 454 (1936).
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might properly consider conflicting affidavits in deciding a disputed
question of fact; in such a case, he is "simply deciding a question of
fact upon affidavits." However, in passing on a motion for summary
judgment, a judge merely looks to the affidavits (and other evidentiary
materials) for the purpose of determining whether there is a genuine issue
of fact between the parties. If the affidavits of the opposing parties show
that there is a genuine issue of fact between the parties, the judge simply
denies the motion for summary judgment; he does not attempt to weigh
the opposing affidavits."
Thus it will be seen that summary judgment affidavits perform a
function quite similar to one function of the pleadings-that of dis-
closing the matters in dispute between the parties. Summary judgment
affidavits are, in a very real sense, merely an extension of the pleadings.
Summary judgment affidavits perform this pleading-type function in the
evidential area. The pleadings themselves are excluded from this area.
It is a fundamental rule that pleadings may not properly include matters
of evidence, that is, they may not properly contain allegations of proba-
tive facts from which ultimate facts may be inferred. 7 And even if an
allegation (even though it is not an allegation of a strictly probative fact)
is unduly specific, it may be held to violate the rule against pleading
evidence. 3" The defendant's answer is usually even more general than
the plaintiff's petition, by reason of the use of denials in the answer.
A denial in an answer not only puts the plaintiff on proof of the allega-
tions denied, but also creates in the defendant a privilege to offer any
proper evidence at the trial which will tend to disprove the allegations
denied. Thus the denial will give the plaintiff no real notice as to the
actual position which the defendant will take at the trial with respect to
36 "Let us assume that in an action for damages for personal injuries
allegedly caused by defendant's negligence, arising from the collision of two
automobiles, plaintiff contends [in an affidavit] that defendant entered the inter-
section where the acc:dent occurred without stopping for a stop sign; defendant
contends [in an affidavit] that he did stop. Assuming that this fact is material to
the question of liability, it is clear that there is here such an issue of fact as will
prevent summary judgment; the trier of fact will have to decide on the basis of
the conflicting evidence which party is correct." Asbill and Snell, Summary
Judgment under the Federal Rules-When an Issue of Fact is Presented, 51 MicH.
L. REV. 1143, 1145 (1953).
37 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 225 (2d ed. 1947).
38 "Similarly, in an action for . . . negligently injuring the plaintiff by the
operation of an automobile, the 'operative' or 'ultimate' facts proved at the trial
will always be specific. It will appear that the defendant was driving a particular
kind of automobile at some particular rate of speed, etc., etc. If now a plaintiff
were to state the facts thus specifically in his complaint he would doubtless be told
by the average court that he had 'pleaded his evidence' and not the 'facts con-
stituting the cause of action.' This would of course be erroneous. What is ac-
cording to accepted notions the proper way to plead is merely a mode of stating
the facts generically rather than specifically." Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading
under the Codes, 21 COL. L. REv. 416, 418419 (1921).
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the facts. In Ohio, denials in an answer may be either general or
specific; 39 in practice, the general denial is used almost exclusively. The
general denial is tempting to the defendant who really has no basis for
disputing the allegations of plaintiff's petition. An answer consisting of
a general denial is easy to prepare, and the defendant who files such an
answer may rationalize it on the questionable basis that there is nothing
improper about "making the plaintiff prove his case." Furthermore,
allegations in an answer of facts which are inconsistent with the allega-
tions of plaintiff's petition, and are therefore admissible under a denial,
are said to be "argumentative denials,"4 and are subject to a motion to
strike. Thus it will be seen the rules of pleading not only permit but
actually require a very considerable degree of generality in the plead-
ings.4 ' As a result of this generality of the pleadings, they often indicate,
on their face, broad issues of fact between the parties.42 In many cases,
however, although the pleadings have thus indicated broad issues between
the parties, the actual conflict between the witnesses at the trial is much
narrower. Sometimes the conflict is so slight that a verdict is directed
for a party; sometimes one party fails to present any evidence whatever,
or even to appear at the trial.
If the proposed summary judgment procedure were available, either
party might move for summary- judgment, filing in support thereof
positively sworn affidavits, which would usually be considerably more
specific than the pleadings of the moving party. The opposing party
would then have a full opportunity to file specific opposing affidavits for
the purpose of controverting the statements in the affidavits of the moving
party. If the opposing party fails to file such affidavits, or if, even though
he files affidavits, they are insufficient, assuming their truth, to controvert
the affidavits of the moving party, then the uncontroverted facts in the
affidavits of the moving party are regarded as not being in issue (even
though the pleadings indicated that they were in issue), and summary
judgment is granted for the moving party, provided of course that the
uncontroverted facts in his affidavits are sufficient to entitle him to judg-
39 OHIo REV. CODE, §2309.13 (1953). The rules of some Ohio Municipal
Courts purport to require that all denials shall be specific. So far as the writer
has been able to determine, these rules have been more honored in the breach than
in the observance.
" CLARK, CODE PLEADINiG, 591 (2d ed., 1947).
41 Although the pleadings in Ohio are somewhat more specific than under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, they nevertheless have a high degree of
generality. It would be most unwise to attempt to require more specific pleading
in Ohio; this would subvert the basic functions of pleading. The proposed sum-
mary judgment statute would leave the pleadings as they are, but would supple-
ment them by the more specific affidavits.
42 The verification of a pleading is sufficient if it states that the affiant be-
lieves the facts stated in the pleading to be true. OHiO REV. CoDE, §2309.49 (1953).
This fact, coupled with the generality of pleadings, makes the danger of a perjury
prosecution for a false verification almost nonexistent.
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ment. But if facts in the moving party's affidavits are controverted by
the opposing party's affidavits, assuming their truth, then such facts in the
moving party's affidavits are regarded as still being in issue.4 3 The court
does not attempt to Pass upon the truth of conflicting affldavits." Thus
it will be seen that the court, in passing on the motion for summary
judgment, is not acting as a trier of the facts, and the affidavits filed in
support of and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment are
not being considered as evidence. It is entirely incorrect to say that the
motion for summary judgment results in "trial by affidavit." The
summary judgment affidavits are, as previously stated, merely an extension
of the pleadings; they pick up where the pleadings stop. They offer an
effective means of narrowing the issues of fact between the parties, but
they cannot be used to decide the issues of fact which actually exist.
A few federal cases, particularly in the Third Circuit, have mis-
takenly held that "a mere allegation in the pleading is sufficient to create
a genuine issue as to a material fact, and thus prevent summary judg-
ment, even though the pleader has made no attempt to controvert affi-
davits and other evidentiary matter presented by his opponent." 5  Such
holdings show a basic misunderstanding of Federal Rule 56, and, if
followed, would virtually destroy the utility of the summary judgment
procedure. Fortunately, there are many decisions to the contrary.4 6
43 Occasionally, the affidavits of the opposing party may contain facts which
impeach, rather than contradict, the affidavits of the moving party. Such im-
peaching affidavits might also be sufficient to cause the denial of summary judgment
to the moving party.
Furthermore, paragraph (E) of the proposed Ohio summary judgment statute
provides for the exceptional case where the opposing party, although genuinely
disputing the allegations of the moving party, is unable for some particular reason
to file an opposing affidavit.
Just as a court does not pass upon the truth of conflicting testimony in
considering a motion for a directed verdict. See note 28, supra.
"The judge is not to weigh affidavits, is not to determine which affidavit is
right and which is wrong. He is simply to see whether, upon the affidavits, there
is a real issue of fact between the parties. Chief Justice Rugg of Massachusetts
has said with regard to this procedure, 'A substitution of trial by affidavits for
trial on evidence clearly is not intended. The duty of the trial judge is to deter-
mine whether there is a substantial issue of fact and not to try such issues if found
to exist (citing many cases). Questions of credibility of affidavits or evidence do
not concern the trial court. If the affidavit of defense shows a substantial issue of
fact; summary judgment should not be ordered even though the affidavit be dis-
believed. If the affidavits on the one side and on the other are directly opposed as
to the facts shown, the case must go to trial.' Norwood Morris Plan Co. v.
McCarthy, 295 Mass. 597, 603-4, 4 N.E. 2d 450, 454- (1936)." Remarks of Mr.
Robert G. Dodge of Boston, member of the U.S. Supreme Court Advisory Com-
mittee, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES, 176
(1939).
4 5 REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, 57 (October, 1955).
46 See Asbill and Snell, supra note 36, and Note, 99 U. OF PA. L. REV. 212,
214-215 (1950), both citing many contrary authorities.
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However, in order to remove any possible doubt on this point, and to
prevent the spread of the erroneous viewpoint in the federal courts, the
Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure recommended the
amendment of Federal Rule 56 by adding the following language at the
end of Paragraph (e):
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported
as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be entered against him.4"
In order to reduce the possibility of a similar misunderstanding in Ohio,
the proposed Ohio summary judgment statute includes a similar provision.
This provision constitutes the last two sentences in paragraph (D). Such
a provision was also included in Senate Bill No. 214. However, the
Code Revision Committee of the Ohio Senate deleted this provision,
apparently for the reason that it was still only a recommendation of the
U. S. Supreme Court Advisory Committee, and had not yet been made a
part of Federal Rule 56. It is the opinion of the writer that the provision
should be all means be included in the Ohio statute. The provision is a
concise expression of the fundamental principle of summary judgment
procedure. It would greatly reduce the possibility of misinterpretation of
the proposed Ohio statute on this vital point. While it is to be hoped that
the Ohio courts would correctly interpret and apply the proposed Ohio
statute even without the inclusion of the provision in question, the experi-
ence under Federal Rule 56 demonstrates the danger of misinterpreta-
tion, and the consequent desirability of including an explicit provision of
this kind.
USE OF MATERIALS OTHER THAN AFFIDAVITS
Although, as stated under the preceding heading, the key feature of
the summary judgment procedure is the use of affidavits, the proposed
Ohio statute is not limited to affidavits. Paragraph (B) of the proposed
statute provides in part that:
Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the plead-
ings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions of the
genuineness of papers or documents, and affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Pleadings. The delineation of the issues in a civil action must begin
with the pleadings. Therefore, if an issue is not made by the pleadings,
it is simply not in the case; it thus presents no problems in connection
47 See note 45, supra. Wright, Rule 56 (e): A Case Study on the Need for
Amendiig the Federal Rules, 69 HARV. L. REV. 839 (1956), makes a convincing
case for the proposed amendment.
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with a motion for summary judgment. On the other hand, even though
the pleadings do raise a given issue, it is of the essence of summary
judgment procedure that the other materials (i.e., affidavits, depositions,
etc.) may eliminate that issue by piercing the allegations of the plead-
ings. 48 Thus, in connection with a motion for summary judgment, the
pleadings perform only the preliminary function of initially defining the
issues. Once the pleadings have performed this preliminary function,
the court, in passing on a motion for summary judgment, then turns to
the affidavits, depositions, etc., to determine whether the issues initially
defined by the pleadings have been eliminated by the more specific ma-
terials. The utility of summary judgment procedure would obviously be
destroyed if the sentence in the proposed statute which has just been
quoted were misinterpreted by an erroneous holding that summary judg-
ment should be denied simply because an issue was raised by the pleadings,
even though the more specific materials showed clearly that the purported
issue was not a genuine issue. As stated supra,49 a few federal courts
have actually misinterpreted Federal Rule 56 in this manner. This
would indicate the desirability of including the last two sentences in
paragraph (D) of the proposed Ohio statute, which have been discussed-
supra.80 It might be possible to redraft paragraph (B) itself to make
this fundamental point clearer; however, the inclusion of the last two
sentences in paragraph (D) is simpler, and should remove any possible
question.
Depositions. It is obviously desirable that the court consider deposi-
tions on file in passing on a motion for summary judgment. The
Supreme Court of Ohio expressly approved their use in connection with
motions to strike sham pleadings. 1
Answers to interrogatories. As in the case of depositions, it is ob-
viously desirable that the court consider answers by a party to interroga-
tories" in passing on a motion for summary judgment.
Admissions of the genuineness of papers or documents. Federal
Rule 56, paragraph (c), refers simply to "admissions." This reference
is to admissions of fact and admissions of genuineness of documents ob-
tained pursuant to Federal Rule 36. The latter Rule provides for a
"written requests for the admission . . . of the genuineness of any
relevant documents . . or of the truth of any relevant matter of fact
48 "The very object of a motion for summary judgment is to separate what
is formal or pretended in denial or averment from what is genuine or substantial,
so that only the latter may subject a suitor to the burden of a trial." Per Judge,
later Justice, Cardozo in Richard v. Credit Suisfe, 242 N.Y. 346, 350, 152 N.E. 110,
111, (1926).
49 See text accompanying note 45, supra.
"" See text following note 47, supra.
z See text accompanying note 4, supra.
52 Either interrogatories annexed to pleadings, pursuant to OHio REV. CODE
.'2309.43 (1953) or interrogatories filed in the action pursuant to OHIO REV. CODE
§2317.07 (1953).
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set forth in the request." There is no such general provision for requests
for admissions in Ohio practice. There is, however, a limited provision
in Ohio for requests for the admission of the genuineness of papers or
documents. This is contained in Ohio Revised Code, Section 2317.31.
Therefore, paragraph (B) of the proposed Ohio summary judgment
statute is correspondingly limited, to conform to Section 2317.31." 3
Oral testimwny. There is no provision in the proposed Ohio sum-
mary judgment statute for the consideration of oral testimony on the
motion for summary judgment. Some federal courts have heard and
considered oral testimony on motion for summary judgment, although
Federal Rule 56 contains no reference to oral testimony.' It is quite
probable that oral testimony could in some cases be used to good ad-
vantage on a motion for summary judgment, and it could therefore be
argued that paragraph (B) of the proposed Ohio statute should include
a reference to oral testimony. As against this, the inclusion in the statute
of a reference to oral testimony might give the erroneous impression that
a hearing on the motion for summary judgment was to be a "little trial,"
preparatory to the actual trial. Such a "little trial" might consume as
much time and effort as the actual trial, thus defeating the purpose of
summary judgment procedure.55  Normally, if the issues between the
parties cannot be eliminated by affidavits, etc., without resort to oral
testimony, this is a strong indication that the court should simply deny
the motion for summary judgment.
Stipulations. The parties may narrow the issues between them by
stipulation for the purpose of a summary judgment, just as they may do
so for the purpose of the trial. Federal courts have considered stipulations
in passing on motions for summary judgment, although Federal Rule 56
contains no reference to stipulations. It seems unnecessary to include an
explicit reference to stipulations in the proposed Ohio summary judgment
statute. 6
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE OPERATION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PROCEDURE
The following illustrations will give a general indication of the
53Paragraph (B) of Senate Bill No. 214 did not include the reference to
"admissions of the genuineness of papers or documents." OHiO REv. CoDa §2317.31
is probably not widely used. However, the reference to admissions of the genuine-
ness of papers or documents should be included in the proposed summary judgment
statute, for completeness.
54 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACrIcE, 2084 (2d ed. 1953). Federal Rule 43 (e) per-
mits the court to hear oral testimony at a hearing on a motion. Ohio practice is
similar.
55 ,... courts should avoid a lengthy 'trial' for the purpose of establishing
that an actual trial is necessary." Id. at 2060.
56The use by the federal courts of materials other than those enumerated in
Federal Rule 56 is discussed id. at 2062, and in Comment, Summary Judgment-
Rule 56, 51 NORTHWESTERN U.L. REV. 370 (1956).
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operation of the proposed Ohio summary judgment statute, if it should
be enacted into law.
Illustration 1. Suit on account (hypothetical case). Henry Merchant
sues John Customer on an account, using the "short form of pleading"
under Ohio Revised Code Section 2309.32. Defendant files an answer
consisting simply of a general denial. Plaintiff moves for summary
judgment, filing in support of his motion a positively sworn affidavit in
which he states specifically that he sold and delivered certain described
merchandise to Defendant at a certain time and place, and for a specified
price, but that Defendant has paid no part of the purchase price, attaching
to his affidavit any documentary proof available. Notwithstanding the
fact that Defendant has filed a general denial, if he fails to file an
opposing affidavit specifically controverting an essential element of
Plaintiff's case, judgment will be entered in favor of Plaintiff. How-
ever, if Defendant files a positively sworn opposing affidavit in which he
specifically denies that the merchandise was sold to him, Plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment will be denied; the court will not attempt to
pass upon the truth of the conflicting affidasits.57
Illustration 2. Suit for foreclosure of mortgage (hypothetical case).
Lewis Lender sues Bill Borrower for the foreclosure of a real estate
mortgage, making the usual allegations employed in such actions. De-
fendant files an answer consisting of a general denial. Plaintiff moves
for summary judgment, filing in support of his motion a positively sworn
affidavit in which he states specifically the facts concerning the creation
of the indebtedness and the execution of the mortgage, and the exact
dates and amounts of all payments on the mortgage by Defendant. The
facts stated in the affidavit clearly indicate that Defendant is in default
and that Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of foreclosure. Notwithstanding
Defendant's general denial, if he fails to file an affidavit setting forth
specific facts indicating that Plaintiff is not entitled to foreclosure, judg-
ment will be entered in favor of Plaintiff. However, if Defendant files
an opposing affidavit, positively sworn to, in which he sets forth specific
facts indicating that Plaintiff is not entitled to foreclosure, Plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment will be denied; the court will not attempt
to pass upon the truth of the conflicting affidazvts.58
Illustration 3. Suit under Federal Employers' Liability Act (actual
case"). Plaintiff Wilkinson alleged in his complaint that Defendants
(as receivers of the Seaboard Airline Railway) were operating a train in
interstate commerce; that he was employed by Defendants to operate the
train and was negligently put to work on or about the train where the
roadbed and right-of-way, due to the negligence of Defendants, was
57 Just as a court does not pass upon the truth of conflicting testimony in
considering a motion for a directed verdict. See notes 28 and 44, supra.
5 8 See notes 28 and 44, supra.
59 Wilkinson v. Powell, 149 F. 2d 335 (C.C.A. 5, 1945).
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unsafe; and that while so working he suffered injuries and burns on and
about his feet, legs, thighs, and body. He prayed for judgment in the
sum of $10,000 and costs. Defendants in their answer denied the allega-
tion of negligence. Defendants moved for summary judgment under
Federal Rule 56, attaching certain affidavits to the motion. Defendants'
affidavits stated these facts: Plaintiff was the conductor of a freight train.
After instructing his crew with regard to switching cars, Plaintiff sat
down by a fire that had been built by an employee of the Southern Kraft
Paper Company some forty feet from the track upon which Plaintiff's
train was standing. While sitting by the fire Plaintiff had a spell, as a
result of which he fell into the fire and received burns about his left leg
and other parts of his body. This fire was not on the premises of the
Defendants nor upon the tracks, roadbeds, or right-of-way controlled or
maintained by them. At the hearing on Defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment, Plaintiff offered no counter-affidavits and no testimony.
In due course, the District Court granted Defendants' motion and entered
summary judgment for the Defendants. Upon appeal, the Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed, stating in part:
.... upon the trial of appellees' motion, appellant's failure to
offer in evidence counter-affidavits or testimony of some kind
to offset the affidavits filed by appellees warranted the court
below in finding that no genuine issue of a material fact
existed.
CONCLUSION
At a time when the delay in the trial of cases and the congestion of
court dockets is a major problem, careful consideration should be given
to any improvement in procedure which will make a contribution toward
the solution of this problem. Summary judgment procedure will as-
suredly make such a contribution. The operation of summary judgment
procedure in New York has been thus described by a New York judge:
In its actual working, Rule 11360 has resulted in none of the
threatened evils. It has not given rise to abuses that were once
feared, that is, to the exclusion of arguable defenses or claims
or to the improper use of the motion to anticipate an opponent's
line of proof. It has reduced delay and congestion in our
calendars. It has tended to minimize the expense of litigation.
It has fostered public confidence in the administration of
justice. 6
An Ohio lawyer recently referred to summary judgment as "a pro-
cedural tool, that, when properly and effectively utilized, can contribute
6 OThe New York summary judgment Rule, adopted in 1921 [author's foot-
note].
61 SHIENTAG, SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 105 (1941). This book contains a detailed
discussion of the actual operation of summary judgment procedure in New York,
written from the viewpoint of a trial judge.
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much to the speedy administration of justice." 62
Summary judgment procedure is long overdue in Ohio, the fifth
most populous State in the Union. It is merely an extension and modern-
ization of the motion to strike sham pleadings. The use of such a motion
was approved by the Supreme Court of Ohio in 1911,63 but it has been
of only limited effectiveness. Some twenty-six states now have summary
judgment procedure. 4 The federal courts have been utilizing it since
1938.
It is to be hoped that Ohio will adopt this thoroughly tried and
tested procedure in the near future.
62 "Some Comparisons of the Ohio Civil Practice and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure," an address by Mr. William E. Knepper of Columbus before
the Ohio Common Pleas Judges Association, December 3, 1957, 31 OHIO BAR 17, 21
(January 13, 1958).
03 See note 2, supra.
64The following tabulation of state summary judgment provisions is taken
principally from Korn and Paley, supra, note 11.
ARIZONA Ray. STAT. ANN., Rules of Civil Proc., Rule 56 (1956) ; ARK. STAT. ANN.
§§29-201 to 29-210, (1947); CALIF. CODE CIV. PROC. §437c (West, 1954); Colo.
Rev. St. Ann. R. Civ. P. 56; 13 Del. Code Ann., Ct. Rule 56 (1953); D.C. Fed.
R.C.P. Rule 56; D.C. Mun. Ct. Rule 16; ILL. ANN. STAT., C. 110 §57 (Smith-Hurd
Civ. Proc. Supp. 1956) ; 58 Iowa Code Ann., R. Civ. P. 237 (1951) ; Ky. Prac. and
Serv. R. Civ. P. 56, (Baldwin's 1956); 3 Md. Ann. Code 4873, General Rules
Prac. & Proc. Summary Judgment Rule 1 (1951); MASSACHUSErrS ANN. LAWS,
c. 231, §59B (1956); Mica. STAT. ANN. §27.989 (1938); Minn. R. Civ. P. 56, 232
Minn. Rep. (1952) ; NEBR. REv. STAT. §25-1330 to 1336 (1956 Reissue) ; 1 Nev. Rev.
Stat. Rule Civ. P. 56 (1956); N.J.R. Civ. P. 4:58 (1953); N.M. STAT. ANN.,
§21-1-1 (56) (1953); N.Y. Rules of Civ. P., Rule 113 (1956); N.D. Rev. Code
§28-0911 (1943); Gen. L. of R.I. §9-7-1 (1956) ; Tex. Ann. Rules, R.C.P. 166A
(1955) ; 9 Utah Code Ann., R. Civ. P. 56 (1953); 2 Va. Code Ann. Rules of
S. Ct. of App., Rule 3:20 (Supp. '56) ; Wash. Rev. Code, Rules of Pleading, Prac.
& Proc., Rule 19 ('56 Supp.); W. VA. CODE ANN. §5524 (1955); Wis. STAT.
§270.635 (1955).
